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ETWEEN 1907 and 1911, executives of American steel manufac-
turers gathered in a series of social events and meetings that be-
came known as the Gary dinners.' Their founder, Judge Elbert
H. Gary, chairman of the board of the United States Steel Corporation
(U.S. Steel), believed the dinners were a lawful way to stabilize steel
prices by enabling manufacturers to tell each other "frankly and freely
what they were doing, how much business they were doing, what prices
they were charging, how much wages they were paying their men, and...
all information concerning their business."'2 The government agreed that
the dinners stabilized prices, but took a different view of their legality. It
brought suit in 1911, pointing to the dinners as one of the reasons why the
court should dissolve U.S. Steel as an illegal monopoly.3 Nine years later,
the Supreme Court held that the dinners amounted to price fixing.4 The
Court went on to hold, however, that U.S. Steel's resort to the dinners
only proved that it lacked the power to control steel prices on its own
and, therefore, could not have unilaterally monopolized the industry.5
Commentators have long questioned the Court's result on the issue of
monopolization. 6 In this essay, however, I will focus on the Court's inter-
mediate conclusion that the dinners were concerted action, a result that
was by no means obvious in antitrust's formative period, when the case
* Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar and Senior Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to thank Herbert
Hovenkamp and Christopher Leslie for their comments.
1. For early accounts of the episode, see MILTON NELS NELSON, OPEN PRICE As-
SOCIATIONS 33-44 (1923) and see generally Maurice H. Robinson, The Gary Dinner Sys-
tem: An Experiment in Cooperative Price Stabilization, 7 Sw. POL. & Soc. SCI. Q. 137
(1926). See also GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETA-
TION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 35-37 (1963).
2. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony vol. 12, at 4889, United States v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (No. 481) (Testimony of Elbert H. Gary).
3. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 60, 81 (D.N.J. 1915), aftd, 251 U.S.
417 (1920).
4. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 440-42 (1920).
5. Id. at 444-45.
6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 29
(1976); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 108-12 (1968); Donald 0.
Parsons & Edward John Ray, The United States Steel Consolidation: The Creation of Mar-
ket Control, 18 J.L. & ECON. 181 (1975).
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was decided. I argue that the reasoning that led to this conclusion, espe-
cially by the trial judges in the case, can still shed light on the agreement
element of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In the next Part, I briefly de-
scribe the legal and historical circumstances in which the dinners oc-
curred. In Part III, I describe what happened at the dinners and at the
related committee meetings. In doing so, I have been aided by the volu-
minous records and briefs in the case (the government brief alone ran to
over 1,000 pages) and by the remarkable volubility of the witnesses, who
were the leading steel executives of the era. After describing the dinners,
I will examine the courts' analyses of them and extract some lessons that
might help modem courts clarify the boundaries of the Sherman Act's
agreement requirement.
II. THE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
On April 1, 1901, the United States Steel Corporation came into be-
ing.7 It was a holding company that controlled Carnegie Steel, Federal
Steel (itself the recent product of a merger of several producers), and ten
other operating companies,8 and had an initial capitalization of $1.4 bil-
lion, an amount equal to about one fourth of the U.S. gross national
product. 9 Called simply "the Corporation" in its early years, U.S. Steel
"was far and away the nation's biggest steel company and the largest in-
dustrial organization of any kind worldwide."' 10 Charles M. Schwab, who
had proposed the creation of U.S. Steel in a famous dinner address the
year before,1' became its first president; Elbert Gary became chairman of
its board and of its executive committee. 12 After a brief power struggle
between the two men,13 Gary gained unquestioned control, which he
maintained until his death in 1927.14
Unlike the chief executives of some of the corporations that U.S. Steel
subsumed, particularly Andrew Carnegie, Gary believed that "'competi-
tion was unprofitable"' and rejected the "'old method of going out into
the market and slashing prices in order to get business."1 5 Under Gary's
leadership, "collaborative action and ...stable, open price structures
helped preserve existing centers of production yet at the same time pro-
vided shelter under which new producers could not only compete but also
earn higher than average profits."'1 6 Gary designed this passive and coop-
erative strategy as much for legal reasons as for business ones. At its
7. KENNETH WARREN, BIG STEEL: THE FIRST CENTURY OF THE UNITED STATES
STEEL CORPORATION, 1901-2001, at 7 (2001).
8. Parsons & Ray, supra note 6, at 182.
9. Id. at 182-83.
10. WARREN, supra note 7, at 7, 73, 265.
11. Id. at 18.
12. Id. at 27.
13. Id. at 27-28. Schwab resigned in 1903 and later became president Bethlehem Steel.
Id. at 28.
14. Id. at 27, 32, 128.
15. Id. at 26-27 (quoting James Gayley, the first vice president of U.S. Steel).
16. Id. at 32.
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formation, U.S. Steel controlled sixty-six percent of American produc-
tion, but Gary took steps to reduce that figure in order to placate both
rivals and antitrust authorities. 17 He admitted to his biographer that he
aimed for a fifty percent share in most markets because William Jennings
Bryan had promoted that figure as a statutory cap.' 8 When U.S. Steel
acquired a major rival in 1907, ostensibly as part of a plan he developed
with J.P. Morgan to calm financial markets during a panic, Gary sought
and received President Roosevelt's approval of the transaction as a way
of insulating it from antitrust liability.
1 9
Gary also tried to comply with antitrust laws in shaping his policy of
cooperation with rivals. For three years after U.S. Steel was formed,
some of its subsidiaries continued to participate in longstanding pools, in
which members submitted detailed monthly reports of their operations to
a commissioner who collected the reports and distributed a compilation
to the members.20 The members also posted bonds that were subject to
forfeiture if a member violated its assigned production quotas and
prices.2 ' In 1904, however, Judge Gary ordered U.S. Steel's subsidiaries
to withdraw from the pools in compliance with established antitrust law.
22
In some of the product lines, the pools were replaced until 1906 by so-
called statistical associations that retained the detailed reporting require-
ments and a central administrator, but eliminated the explicit fixing of
prices and assignment of production quotas.2 3
17. Thomas K. McCraw & Forest Reinhardt, Losing to Win: U.S. Steel's Pricing, In-
vestment Decisions, and Market Share, 1901-1938, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 593, 610-13 (1989).
18. IDA M. TARBELL, THE LIFE OF ELBERT H. GARY: THE STORY OF STEEL 257-58
(1925).
19. See Marc Winerman, Antitrust and the Crisis of '07, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec.
2008, at 3, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/12/DecO8-Winermanl2-22f.pdf.
Winerman quotes Roosevelt's letter to his Attorney General explaining the reasons for the
acquisition and reporting that he told Gary that he "felt it no public duty of mind" to
object. Id. at 3-4.
20. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony vol. 2, at 816-21, United States v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (No. 481) (Testimony of John C. Langan) (identifying the
Steel Shafting Association, the Structural Steel Association, and the Steel Plate
Association).
21. Id. at 819-20, 824.
22. Brief of Appellees at 206-07, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920)
(No. 481); MELVIN L. UROFSKY, BIG STEEL AND THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY
IN BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 2-3 (1969); see also JOSEPH E. DAVIES, UNITED
STATES BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 15 (1916)
(observing that, because "[l]egal difficulties had at an earlier date ... discouraged the use
of written price and pooling agreements as means of combination," firms adopted the form
of the "gentlemen's agreement," which aimed to "procure substantial harmony in policy
among competitors regarding volume of output and prices, without specific written or oral
agreements, but rather by tacit understandings and the communication of information re-
garding the production and prices of the various cooperating interests in order to insure
good faith").
23. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 15, at 6036-37,
6048 (Testimony of William Chase Temple). A participant in the pools and the statistical
associations characterized the latter as involving a gentlemen's agreement, in which the
participants, "after discussing conditions agree among themselves, without any penalty or
anything else but a moral obligation, that they will charge so much for their product."
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What followed were the Gary dinners. Some commentators have sug-
gested that, by "inaugurat[ing] the famous (if short lived) Gary dinners,
at which prices were openly discussed,"2 4 Gary uncharacteristically
flouted antitrust law.2 5 But Gary designed the dinners to achieve the
goals of non-expansion and cooperation while avoiding antitrust liabil-
ity.26 Gary believed, as he asserted in speeches again and again, that an
illegal agreement required an exchange of promises to adhere to the same
price.27 Three months after the first dinner, he assured the Attorney
General that the steel producers were:
perfectly satisfied to limit the amount of our business to our propor-
tion of capacity and to do everything possible we can to promote the
interests of our competitors; and by frequent meetings and the in-
terchange of opinions [they had] thus far been able to accomplish
this result without making any agreements of any kind.28
As I show in Part IV, Gary's fellow steel producers were well schooled in
his antitrust compliance program and shaped their conduct and state-
ments at the dinners and committee meetings accordingly.2 9
The dinners were an important part of the government's suit to dissolve
U.S. Steel in 1911. A panel of four judges of the Third Circuit heard the
case as a trial court in the District of New Jersey under the Expediting
Act of 1903.30 In 1915, the court issued two opinions that held, for rea-
sons that I describe in Part IV, that the Gary dinners constituted an un-
lawful combination when they occurred. 31 Nevertheless, both opinions
concluded that U.S. Steel had not monopolized the steel industry.32
Judges Buffington and McPherson saw the formation of U.S. Steel
through mergers in 1901 as a legitimate effort to achieve productive effi-
ciencies through specialization, integration, and economies of scale. 33
The Gary dinners, although unlawful, were "exceptional" and unlikely to
recur.34 Judges Woolley and Hunt, by contrast, saw the merger as an ef-
Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 6, at 2435 (Testimony of
Willis L. King).
24. McCraw & Reinhardt, supra note 17, at 612.
25. Id. at 611-12.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 158-59 (D.N.J. 1915) (Buff-
ington, J., concurring), affd, 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
28. Letter from Judge Elbert H. Gary, Chairman of the Bd., U.S. Steel Corp. to
Charles Bonaparte, Attorney General of the United States (Feb. 11, 1908), quoted in
KOLKO, supra note 1, at 36 (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 6, at 2104
(Testimony of Willis L. King).
30. Expediting Act of Feb. 11, 1903, § 1, 32 Stat. 823, amended June 25, 1910, 36 Stat.
854; U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. at 57. The Act provided for trial of cases of "general public
importance" by "not less than three of the circuit court judges of said circuit." Expediting
Act § 1. This part of the Act was eliminated by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act
of 1974, § 4, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708 (1974).
31. See United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 159-61 (D.N.J. 1915) (Buffington,
J., concurring), affd, 251 U.S. 417 (1920); id. at 176 (Woolley, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 57, 110 (Buffington, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 139.
34. Id. at 154, 160-61.
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fort to monopolize the industry, but one that had failed because of unex-
pectedly fierce competition from independents. 35 The Gary dinner
episode 36 proved that, with fifty percent of the market, U.S. Steel could
not unilaterally "dominate the industry by compelling the trade to sell at
prices it desired"; it could only restrain trade by pools and dinners, in
which it was no more culpable than any other participating manufac-
turer.37 The producers of the other forty percent of steel output that co-
operated in the dinners "did so voluntarily" and "cheerfully. '38 Thus,
both opinions agreed that dissolution was unnecessary to prevent recur-
rence of this kind of collaboration.39
On direct review under the Expediting Act, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the district court, 40 with Justice McKenna's majority opinion
largely endorsing Judge Woolley's analysis:41 U.S. Steel's organizers had
tried to gain monopoly power, but failed because "opposing conditions
were underestimated. '42 U.S. Steel had engaged in no "brutalities or tyr-
annies" aimed at its rivals like freight rebates and predatory pricing.43
U.S. Steel could exercise monopoly power only by "persuad[ing]" its ri-
vals to participate in "pools, associations, trade meetings, and . . . the
social form of dinners, all of them, it may be, violations of the law, but
transient in their purpose and effect."' 44 The dinners occurred intermit-
tently until 1911, the Court observed, "but, after instances of success and
failure, were abandoned nine months before this suit was brought," and
there was no "evidence of an intention to resume them."'45 Apart from
these concerted efforts, U.S. Steel was unable to maintain noncompeti-
tive prices: "[t]he suggestion that lurks in the government's contention
that the acceptance of the corporation's prices is the submission of impo-
tence to irresistible power was, in view of the testimony of the competi-
tors, untenable. '46
U.S. Steel marked the end of the first era of large-scale public monopo-
lization cases.47 Its reasoning was dubious on several grounds. Modern
studies suggest, for example, that even after it ceded market share to
smaller rivals, U.S. Steel retained a substantial part of the monopoly
35. Id. at 170-71 (Woolley, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 178 (finding that the episode "ended with the dinner of January 11, 1911"
and the filing of the government's case).
37. Id. at 175-76.
38. Id. at 176. Judge Woolley pointedly identified, for each subcommittee, the U.S.
Steel subsidiary and its independent competitors. Id. at 177 n.4.
39. Id. at 161, 178 (Buffington, J., concurring); id. at 176 (Woolley, J., concurring).
40. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 417 (1920).
41. Id. at 442.
42. Id. at 444.
43. Id. at 440-41.
44. Id. at 444-45.
45. Id. at 445.
46. Id. at 449-50.
47. William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IowA L. REv. 1105, 1115-16 (1989).
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power it acquired in the 1901 merger.48 Its participation in efforts like
the Gary dinners to maintain prices with its rivals was in no way inconsis-
tent with this conclusion, because a dominant firm has every incentive to
persuade fringe firms to maintain prices and limit expansion.49 For pre-
sent purposes, however, I will set this critique to one side and focus on an
issue that the courts in the U.S. Steel litigation analyzed correctly:
whether the Gary dinners amounted to unlawful concerted action.
III. THE DINNERS AND THE STEEL MARKET
The Gary dinners occurred in two phases. The first series of dinners,
which Judge Gary personally convoked, began in late 1907 and ended in
early 1909, with Gary's declaration of an "open market." The second se-
ries of dinners and meetings, held under different auspices but still domi-
nated by Gary's personality and vision, began later that year and
continued until mid-1911, just before the government filed its monopoli-
zation case.
A. PHASE ONE: FROM THE FIRST DINNER TO THE OPEN MARKET
The first Gary dinner took place at New York's Waldorf Astoria Hotel
on November 20, 1907, in the midst of an economic panic. 50 At Gary's
invitation, executives representing ninety percent of domestic iron and
steel production attended.51 Judge Gary later testified that, by preaching
calm and providing a forum for manufacturers to share information, he
hoped:
to prevent the demoralization of business, to maintain so far as prac-
ticable the stability of business and to prevent, if [he] could-not by
agreement, but by exhortation-the wide and sudden fluctuation of
prices which would be injurious to everyone interested in the busi-
ness of the iron and steel manufacturers. 52
He "made it perfectly plain" to those present "that under no circum-
stances would [he] do or say anything that did not leave [their] company
free to go out and do exactly as it pleased with respect to prices and
48. See, e.g., Hideki Yamawaki, Dominant Firm Pricing and Fringe Expansion: The
Case of the U.S. Iron and Steel Industry, 1907-1930, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 429, 437 (1985)
(presenting statistical evidence that U.S. Steel acted as dominant firm).
49. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Entrepreneurship, Business Organization, and Economic
Concentration, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 403, 430 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds.,
2000) (arguing that the Gary Dinners were more effective than formal pools because of the
threat of price cutting by a dominant firm to punish cheating); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN &
WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 43-44 (2d ed.
2006) (arguing that the Gary Dinners were an effort to bolster U.S. Steel's role as a price
leader).
50. ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM THE MARKET'S PERFECT STORM 2 (2007); Robinson, supra note 1, at 138.
51. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 6, at 2092-93 (Testi-
mony of Willis L. King).
52. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 12, at 4889 (Testi-
mony of Elbert H. Gary) (emphasis added).
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everything else."'53 After he spoke, the guests "expressed opinions... in
regard to the market and what ought to be done .... Nothing was said...
about maintaining a price of a certain commodity at so much; but there
were opinions expressed as to whether or not prices were fair and reason-
able .. . . "-54 Some of the guests testified that Judge Gary urged them to
keep their heads and not to try to seek out new business and thus drive
down prices.5 5 Other dinners occurred the following year, with a similar
format.56
At the initial dinner, the representatives voted to create a general com-
mittee of five members, chaired by Judge Gary, to form subcommittees
for each of their product lines.5 7 Ultimately, there were subcommittees
for ore and pig iron, pipes and tubular goods, wire products, rails and
billets (steel ingots), structural material, plates, steel bars, and sheets and
tin plates.58 According to participants, the frequency of the meetings va-
ried depending upon the products covered, but all involved a discussion
of conditions followed by statements from the representatives of the
prices they intended to charge, 59 which were usually the same prices.60
The witnesses insisted that they made no promises or agreements, 6 ' but
that they left the meetings with a "general understanding" that each firm
would adhere to its announced prices unless circumstances warranted a
change, in which case they would inform the other members.62
53. Id. at 4890.
54. Id. at 4889.
55. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, at 2091; id. vol. 11, at
4195 (Testimony of Charles M. Schwab); id. vol. 14, at 5682 (Testimony of James H. Reed).
56. Judge Gary recalled subsequent events occurring on January 30, 1908, April 2,
1908, May 21, 1908, and December 10, 1908. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony,
supra note 2, vol. 12, at 4895-96, 4900 (Testimony of Elbert H. Gary).
57. Robinson, supra note 1, at 140.
58. Brief of Appellant at 931 n.1, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
(1920). Judge Gary told the appointees to the subcommittees that "[wihile it is advisable
that no agreements contrary to law be entered into, there is no objection to frequent con-
sultations for the purpose of receiving full information and for the frank interchange of
opinions concerning the business interests of all." Id. at 933 n.1.
59. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 20, at 8037 (Testi-
mony of John L. Haines); Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 5,
at 1778 (Testimony of Edwin B. Crawford); id. vol. 8, at 3072 (Testimony of William E.
Corey); id. vol. 5, at 1836 (Testimony of James Anson Campbell); id., vol. 6, at 2493 (Testi-
mony of Samuel A. Benner); Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony, supra note 2,
vol. 19, at 7806 (Testimony of William W. Lukens).
60. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 5 at 1810-11 (Testi-
mony of B.G. Follansbee) ("When we left the meeting we practically had come to exactly
the same conclusion all around that whatever price was made, whether it was lowering or
advancing, we would sell on those figures."); id. vol. 19, at 7806 (Testimony of William W.
Lukens).
61. Id. vol. 11, at 4195 (Testimony of Charles M. Schwab).
62. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 6, at 2104 (Testi-
mony of Willis L. King) (stating that he "would undoubtedly have felt that I should notify
[rivals] if I cut the price," but only out of common decency, and not because of an agree-
ment); id. vol. 5 at 1777 (Testimony of Edwin B. Crawford); id. vol. 5 at 1836-37 (Testimony
of James Anson Campbell) (stating that, as chairman, he would "always [make] the state-
ment ... that there could be no agreements among [them]" but that he "called on each
[member] to state what their policy would be in the future with reference to the sale of
their products and with reference to price"; there would usually, though not always, be a
2009]
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As an illustration of the proceedings at committee meetings, the district
court in the monopolization case quoted the testimony of Samuel Benner
of Carnegie Co., a subsidiary of U.S. Steel.63 Benner insisted that the
meetings entailed no "formal undertaking" or "absolute promise made by
anybody" concerning prices, but only statements of intent. 64 He con-
ceded, however, that the manufacturers left the meetings "with the gen-
eral understanding, each relying upon the other, that the prices
announced would be maintained. '65 This exchange, not quoted by the
court, followed:
By Mr. Lindabury [for the defendant]
Q. That [reliance] was faith and hope, though, rather than promise
and contract, was it not?
A. Yes.
By Mr. Dickinson [for the government]:
Q. Was a good deal of it faith?
A. Mostly hope.
Q. Did you expect to observe your announcement?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you observe it?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did others observe it?
A. The larger concerns, the stronger concerns, yes.66
The court also quoted the testimony of Edwin Crawford, president of
McKeesport Tin Plate Co., that "[tihere would be a general understand-
ing that we would do what we would say we would do-quote a certain
figure until ... we found reason to change it," in which case "we would
notify our competitors" and "another meeting would be held."'67 Craw-
ford and some other witnesses also claimed to have felt a "moral obliga-
tion," albeit a conditional one, to adhere to their stated prices. 68 Others
"general understanding; that is, [they] had the statement of the different representatives
that their policy would be to market their product at the then prevailing price until they
notified their competitors that they wanted to change their price").
63. United States v. U.S. Steel, 223 F. 55, 159 (D.N.J. 1915) (Buffington, J.,
concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id. Later, he conceded that the participants left the meeting "each relying upon
the other that [the announced] price would be observed by them, and that the announce-
ment of the price was made to the trade." Id. at 160. The full text of these passages
appears at Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 6, at 2506-09
(Testimony of Samuel A. Brenner).
66. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 6, at 2509 (Testi-
mony of Samuel A. Brenner).
67. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 160. The complete passage is in Transcript of Record, Plain-
tiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 5, at 1777 (Testimony of Edwin R. Crawford).
68. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 160; Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20,
vol. 5, at 1793 (Testimony of Edwin R. Crawford); see also Transcript of Record, Defend-
ants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 19, at 7889, 7891, 7893 (Testimony of Harry D. Westfal);
Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 5, at 1780, 1781 (Testimony
of Edwin R. Crawford); id. vol. 5, at 1812, 1813 (Testimony of B. G. Follansbee); id. vol. 5,
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described adhering to their announced prices as "common decency. ' 69
Some said they acted in reliance on the statements of those in attend-
ance, 70 and that most, though not all, did as they had announced.71 They
also understood that rivals would discover any deviations from stated
prices and would bring them up for discussion at a later meeting.72
The meetings evidently succeeded in maintaining prices to some degree
on several fabricated steel product lines during the first half of 1908, even
as the prices of ore and pig iron declined. 73 By mid-1908, pressures from
price-cutters and secondary producers forced the major manufacturers to
lower their own prices.74 After a meeting of the "'leading steel manufac-
turing companies,"' Judge Gary announced that it was "'understood that
the price of iron ore has been or will soon be reduced 50 cents per ton
base. Each one of the steel manufacturers expressed the opinion that
there should be a readjustment in the prices of the respective commodi-
ties"' in specified amounts.75 Although price cutting continued, U.S.
Steel maintained these prices until February of 1909, when the company's
finance committee decided that the policy of restraint was not working.76
at 1855 (Testimony of James Anson Campbell); id. vol. 2, at 741 (Testimony of John A.
Topping).
69. Id. vol. 2, at 741 (Testimony of John A. Topping). Topping explained that the
obligation was a matter of "common decency." He conceded that it was not always com-
mon decency, but only when rivals were "[e]xchanging business information and trying to
help one another in [their] general operations." Id. He added that he expected the same
obligation of some but not all of his rivals. Id. at 746. Judge Gary also used this phrase in a
speech at the dinner of January 11, 1911, in which he reminded the assembled representa-
tives of their "high moral obligation ... towards [their] neighbor." Transcript of Record,
Government's Exhibits vol. 4, at 1389, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
(1920) (No. 481) (Exhibit No. 140: Remarks of E.H. Gary, Made at a Dinner Given at
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, January 11, 1911).
70. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 5, at 1811 (Testi-
mony of B.G. Follansbee) (agreeing that he "le[ft] with reliance" he and others would
adhere to announced prices); id. vol. 5, at 1839 (Testimony of James Anson Campbell)
(agreeing that when he announced a price he "expect[ed] the others to rely upon the an-
nouncement that [he] would observe it" and had the same reliance in others' announce-
ments); id. at 1841 (observing that the events in meetings of the tube subcommittee, billet
and sheet bar subcommittee, and the tin and sheet steel subcommittee were "[p]ractically
the same"); Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 19, at 7806
(Testimony of William W. Lukens) (agreeing that he made statements of policy in good
faith and with the expectation or hope that others would view them in that way, and that
he accepted at least some of the statements of others).
71. Id. vol. 20, at 8037 (Testimony of John L. Haines) (agreeing that "the prices were
fairly well maintained by the manufacturers that made ... announcements" of the prices
they expected to charge).
72. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 5, at 1838-39 (Testi-
mony of James Anson Campbell); id. vol. 6, at 2506 (Testimony of Samuel A. Benner)
(stating that prices would be maintained until "one competitor [took] business away from
another competitor," in which case the parties would meet again).
73. Robinson, supra note 1, at 146-47.
74. Kolko claims that "the Gary agreement was nominal rather than real" after June
1908 and was "formally terminated" in 1909 because of cheating and widespread pressure
to cut prices. KOLKO, supra note 1, at 36.
75. Robinson, supra note 1, at 150 n. 52 (quoting IRON TRADE REV., June 11, 1908).
76. Id. at 151.
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At a meeting of manufacturers called on February 18, 1909,77 Judge
Gary announced that U.S. Steel would no longer "cooperate in the sense
we had been cooperating" by meeting to share information about its busi-
ness. 78 He insisted that he had never shared information pursuant to an
agreement that required his rivals would act in a certain way.79 Never-
theless, "there is a fair way of doing business... and an unfair way." '80 It
had become apparent that "there was a disposition on the part of many of
the small manufacturers to keep their mills running full regardless of the
price [and] that we were the only ones who were really selling at the
prices at which we advertised we were selling."'81 Consequently, he an-
nounced that U.S. Steel would "withdraw from any meeting at which I
am expected to tell you anything about our business, and we will go
alone."' 82 The president of U.S. Steel then instructed a key subsidiary
"that he was at liberty to meet any competitive conditions that he
found."'83 Prices fell and output increased substantially during this "open
market,"84 with most of the new sales going to U.S. Steel.85
B. PHASE Two: FROM THE LOVING Cup DINNER TO THE FILING OF
THE GOVERNMENT CASE
Suitably chastened, the steel manufacturers held another dinner at the
Waldorf on October 15, 1909, not at Gary's invitation, but ostensibly to
present him with a "loving cup" and to praise him for his heroic efforts to
save the steel industry during the panic of 1907.86 Gary had, one speaker
said, supplanted the "old order" of instability with a "new" order in
which the Judge "gave us good advice, which has made us a great deal of
money."'87 Evidently, the subcommittee meetings resumed. 88 The gov-
77. According to Gary, the meeting was "called by ... some one other than [himself]"
and "was nominally held under the auspices of the [nascent] American Iron and Steel
Institute." Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 12, at 4901 (Tes-
timony of Elbert H. Gary).
78. Id. at 4902.
79. Id. at 4902-03.
80. Id. at 4903.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Brief of Appellees, supra note 22, at 255.
84. Robinson, supra note 1, at 151-52.
85. Transcript of Record, Government's Exhibits, supra note 69, vol. 2, at 539 (Min-
utes of the Board of Directors of Carnegie Steel Co., March 22, 1909, Report of Henry P.
Bope) ("In general, the business that has been placed has largely come to us. The other
mills seem to think that the pace we are setting is a little too fast for them .... ").
86. Robinson, supra note 1, at 153 ("[I]t was evident to all parties that the call for a
general meeting of the steel manufacturers would be received with better grace if it were
cloaked under a summons less obvious than an invitation to another Gary dinner.").
87. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Exhibits vol. 3, at 348, 349-50, United States v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (No. 481) (Exhibit No. 82: Address of Mr. Willis L.
King, October 15, 1909).
88. Several witnesses indicated that committee meetings occurred until 1910. Tran-
script of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 3, at 1346 (Testimony of W.P.
Worth) (describing the Tm Plate subcommittee); id., vol. 5, at 1780 (Testimony of Edwin R.
Crawford) (describing the Tin Plate subcommittee); id., vol. 5, at 1804 (Testimony of B.G.
Follansbee) (describing the Sheet and Tin Plate subcommittees); Transcript of Record, De-
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eminent offered evidence that, the month after the meeting, U.S. Steel's
finance committee recommended price increases and its largest subsidi-
ary "advanced the prices of structural shapes, plates, and bars until they
reached about the level that had prevailed prior to the break in prices on
February 19, 1909." 89 Summarizing this sequence of events on oral argu-
ment before the Supreme Court, the government asserted that "the Cor-
poration decided to give its competitors a taste of competition. .. so that
they would know better than to break away so far next time, they came
together and gave Gary a loving cup, meetings were resumed, and prices
advanced."90
During this period, Gary also sponsored the creation of the American
Iron and Steel Institute, a more permanent forum for steel producers to
exchange information. At its first official meeting on October 14, 1910,91
Gary described the institute as a way "to afford means of communication
between members of the iron and steel trades upon matters bearing upon
their business affairs," including matters of "ethic[s]. ' '92 Ethics, in this
context, included adhering to announced prices and avoiding secret dis-
counting. The first matter of concern for the institute was "maintenance
of stable conditions," especially "reasonable prices. '93 Supply and de-
mand should depend upon "mutual consideration and decision" by buy-
ers and sellers.94 Stability should be maintained by "[f]rank and friendly
intercourse; full disclosure of his business by each to the others; recogni-
tion by all of the rights of each."'95 Gary insisted once again that no
"agreement, express or implied" is necessary to achieve stability.96 He
quoted the Attorney General's argument in the pending appeal in the
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States97 case that "the law does
not compel competition; it only prohibits an agreement not to com-
pete."'98 Thus,
[i]f competitors are in frequent communication and make full disclo-
sures to each other in regard to their business, notifying one another
fendants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 20, 8036-37 (Testimony of John L. Haines) (describ-
ing the Structural Steel subcommittee). At least one witness suggested that the meetings
continued into 1911. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 5, 1842
(Testimony of James Anson Campbell).
89. Brief of Appellant, supra note 58, at 965.
90. Transcript of Oral Argument at 129, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
(1920) (No. 6).
91. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 12, at 4907 (Testi-
mony of Elbert H. Gary) (stating that the institute was organized in May 1909 and had its
first annual meeting on October, 10 1910).
92. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Exhibits, supra note 87, vol. 2, at 248 (Exhibit
No. 61: Address of Mr. E. H. Gary at a meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute at
Waldorf-Astoria, New York, Oct. 14, 1910).
93. Id. at 249-51.
94. Id. at 251.
95. Id. at 252.
96. Id.
97. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
98. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Exhibits, supra note 87, vol. 2, at 252 (Exhibit
No. 61: Address of President E.H. Gary, June 3, 1913).
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of what they are doing, it will follow as a natural result that no one
will take advantage of the information he thus receives to act un-
justly or dishonorably towards his neighbor. 99
On January 11, 1911, at another dinner at the Waldorf, Judge Gary said
demand had fallen to fifty percent of the industry's capacity and that
"there [was] no possible way of protecting one another and thereby pro-
tecting oneself except to submit [themselves] to the conditions as they
exist and take and be satisfied with our fair proportion of the business
which is offered." 100 He cautioned that the law prohibited agreements to
suppress competition, but asserted:
[W]e have something better to guide and control us in our business
methods than a contract which depends upon written or verbal
promises with a penalty attached. We as men, as gentlemen, as
friends, as neighbors, having been in close communication and con-
tact during the last few years, have reached a point where we enter-
tain for one another respect and affectionate regard. We have
reached a position so high in our lines of activity that we are bound
to protect one another; and when a man reaches a position where his
honor is at stake, where even more than life itself is concerned,
where he cannot act or fail to act except with a distinct and clear
understanding that his honor is involved, then he has reached a posi-
tion that is more binding on him than any written or verbal contract
(Applause). 10 1
Gary stressed "that every one of us should have a keen and abiding sense
of the personal obligation which he has towards all others and to make no
mistake of running the risk of trespassing within the domain of the rights
of his neighbor.' 10 2
He rejected "insinuations" in the press that U.S. Steel "carried a big
stick" and called the independents together to "lectur[e]" or "threaten[ ]"
them to maintain prices. 0 3 He told the guests: "[i]f any of you desire to
lower prices . . . and will make the fact known to me, you will find that I
am a follower and not a stubborn opposer."'01 4 However, he did take the
opportunity to "express my opinions in regard to what I think are fair
prices. ' 10 5 And "my opinion is that it would be a mistake to reduce
prices at this time.' 0 6 He also rejected assertions in the press that steel
manufacturers were fixing prices, insisting that:
[W]e are independent [and] can go out of this room and do exactly as
we please, without violating any agreement or understanding,
99. Id. at 252-53.
100. Transcript of Record, Government's Exhibits, supra note 69, vol. 4, at 1386 (Ex-
hibit No. 140: Remarks of E.H. Gary, Made at a Dinner Given at Waldorf Astoria Hotel,
January 11, 1911).
101. Id. at 1387.
102. Id. at 1389.
103. Id. at 1390.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1391.
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and ... all must depend upon the belief that, as honorable men we
are desirous of conducting ourselves and our business in such a way
as not to injure our neighbors ...and there will be no secrecy in
what we do.107
Other speakers at the meeting also stated their opposition to cutting
prices as a way to stimulate demand, 10 8 and emphasized the importance
of keeping one another informed in order to resist efforts by customers to
negotiate lower prices. 109
On May 15, 1911, the Supreme Court affirmed the dissolution of the
Standard Oil Trust.110 Nine days later, at a meeting of the Iron and Steel
Institute, the president of Republic Steel announced a significant reduc-
tion in the price of steel bars. He informed his rivals of the cut, he said,
out of "moral[ ] obligat[ion]" and "courtesy,""' stating that he would
have "expected the same" of at least some of his rivals, including U.S.
Steel. 112 Judge Gary called a luncheon of steel manufacturers at the Met-
ropolitan Club on May 29, during which he expressed his support for the
President and Congress in whatever regulation they might choose to im-
pose on the steel industry. 113 He referred to Republic's recent price cut
and expressed good will toward all who gave "frank expression" of what
they chose to do, insisting that he would never agree on prices, but urging
the guests "so far as you can, so far as you have the lawful right, to stand
together or at least to come together in friendly intercourse, not reserving
to yourselves any question of information or knowledge you have." 114
He claimed that "[tihere is only a certain amount of business[, and] ...
you cannot change it" by taking away rivals' business temporarily.11 5 He
reminded them of what a "splendid thing" it was that they had cooper-
ated over the past four years, because they had been able to thwart buy-
ers' efforts to negotiate lower prices by lying about what producers were
charging. 16 He closed by advocating "stability of prices" in the interests
of all.117 On June 1, Iron Age published an article quoting Judge Gary at
the Metropolitan Club meeting: "[I]t was the unanimous opinion that co-
107. Id. at 1392-93.
108. Id. at 1402-03 (Remarks of E.C. Felton); id. at 1418-19 (Remarks of A.F. Huston).
109. Id. at 1407-08 (Remarks of William M. Grace); id. at 1405 (Remarks of E.A.S.
Clarke). The government argued that the records of the dinner showed that "Gary called
upon practically all of the leading manufacturers, and they almost without exception, ex-
pressed themselves as opposed to any reduction in prices." Brief of Appellant, supra note
58, at 999. Moreover, those prices were "common prices that were then definitely known to
each of them." Id. at 1000.
110. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81-82 (1911).
111. Transcript of Record, Plaintiff's Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 2, at 740 (Testimony
of John A. Topping).
112. Id. at 745.
113. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Exhibits, supra note 87, vol. 3, at 296, 298-99(Exhibit No. 66: Remarks by Mr. E. H. Gary at a luncheon, given to certain iron and steel
manufacturers at the Metropolitan Club, New York on May 29, 1911).
114. Id. at 302-03.
115. Id. at 304.
116. Id. at 304, 306.
117. Id. at 307.
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operation, as heretofore fully explained, should be continued. ' 118 More-
over, Judge Gary reported that U.S. Steel's subsidiaries had "decided to
make adjustments" of price in response to Republic's price cuts "effective
June 1, and it [was] believed that these [would] be generally followed." 119
A list of prices followed.
This action was to be the last, at least in public, of the Gary dinners
episode. A committee of the House Representatives chaired by Augustus
Stanley began hearings on U.S. Steel in May 1911.120 On July 1, 1911 the
Commerce Department's Bureau of Corporations, a predecessor of the
Federal Trade Commission, issued the first of its massive reports on the
steel industry. 121 Although this initial report did not discuss the Gary
dinners, the Commissioner did state in his letter of submittal that price
competition between U.S. Steel and the independents "has been modified
by the policy of 'cooperation." '' 12 2 The Attorney General filed his peti-
tion for injunction and dissolution of U.S. Steel in the United States Dis-
trict Court in Trenton, New Jersey on October 26, 1911.123
IV. THE GARY DINNERS AS CONCERTED ACTION
On June 3, 1915, after a lengthy trial, the district court, through two
concurring opinions, decided that U.S. Steel had not monopolized the
steel industry. 124 In the course of reaching that conclusion, however,
both of the court's opinions found, and the Supreme Court later agreed,
that the Gary dinners and the committee meetings constituted an unlaw-
ful combination.125 This determination was an important step in the in-
terpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act for reasons that may not be
fully appreciated today. Judge Gary and the other participants, including
many who acted on the advice of counsel, were convinced that the din-
ners and committee meetings were lawful because the participants had
118. Transcript of Record, Defendants' Testimony, supra note 2, vol. 14, at 5450 (Testi-
mony of Elbert H. Gary).
119. Id.
120. United States Steel Corporation: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Investigation
of Unites States Steel Corporation, 62d Cong. (1911). See also the committee's report,
HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTIGATION OF UNITED STATES STEEL
CORP., H.R. REP. No. 1127 (2d Sess. 1912), which concluded that the dinners fixed prices
and limited output "just as certainly, just as effectively, and just as unlawfully as had been
done under the discarded pooling agreements of former years." Id. at 126. The minority
report cautioned that "the question raised by these dinners is a somewhat difficult and
delicate one," and that "it would require a far more careful scrutiny into the facts and the
methods of the men who met at the Gary dinners than was given to them ... by the
committee" to determine if they were unlawful. Id. at 324-25.
121. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY Pt. 1, at i (1911).
122. Id. at xxiii.
123. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 60 (D.N.J. 1915), afj'd, 251 U.S. 417
(1920).
124. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 437 (1920), affg 223 F. 55 (D.N.J.
1951). The case was heard in district court by four circuit judges who "agreed that the bill
should be dismissed[, but] disagreed as to the reasons for it." Id.
125. Id. at 442.
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scrupulously avoided making any promises about their future pricing be-
havior. The district court judges absolved the participants of any intent to
violate the law as they had (mistakenly) understood it.12 6 Most strikingly,
neither of the district court opinions cited a single case as authority for
their reasoning on the legality of the dinners, apparently conceding that
they were breaking new ground. 127 In part because the judges were
aware of the novelty of the issue, their analyses shed light on aspects of
the law of section 1 that remain troublesome to courts in the twenty-first
century. Interestingly, the court's reasoning anticipates an important
modern theory of concerted action.
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS
In addition to its challenge to the Gary dinners, the government
pointed to a remarkable instance of consciously parallel pricing as evi-
dence that U.S. Steel was colluding with its rivals. It claimed "the fact
that standard Bessemer steel rails have for... the whole life of the Steel
Corporation, been sold at the uniform price of $28 per ton.., evidences
the existence of a combination among all rail mills, including the Steel
Corporation, to control the price. ' 128 Judge Buffington held, however,
that even such prolonged identical pricing was not evidence of collusion,
because "rail manufacturers simply followed that basic price to prevent
the ruinous rail wars of the past. ' 129 He accepted the explanation of
Charles M. Schwab, a former president of U.S. Steel:
[I]f I were to vary that price of $28 for rails, which seems to have
been recognized by all rail manufacturers as a fair price and giving a
fair profit, if I were to vary that 10 cents a ton, I would precipitate a
steel war . . . that would result in ruining my works without any
profit. Everybody by tacit and mutual understanding felt the same
about that. . . . I would not vary the price of my rails under any
circumstances, not if I knew it was to get 100,000 tons in order, for
126. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 161 (Buffington, J., concurring); id. at 174 (Wolley, J.,
concurring).
127. The court might have cited Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914), decided the previous year. In that case, the Supreme Court
condemned the defendant's program of circulating a blacklist of lumber wholesalers who
sold directly to consumers in competition with the association's members. Id. at 606. Most
members refused to deal with blacklisted wholesalers as a "natural consequence" of the
"concerted action" of circulating the list. Id. at 612. Consequently, the Court inferred a
boycott agreement from the dissemination of information and subsequent actions in re-
straint of trade, even though the association's members did not formally agree to boycott
the disfavored wholesalers. Id. at 608-09.
128. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 150 (Buffington, J., concurring). One executive testified that
the steel rails sold for a "standard price" that he never discussed with rivals. Transcript of
Record, Plaintiffs testimony, supra note 20, vol. 14, at 5715-16 (Testimony of James H.
Reed); see also WARREN, supra note 7, at 35-36 (stating that the price of steel rails, estab-
lished at the first meeting of U.S. Steel's executive committee, remained at $28 per ton for
fifteen years); Transcript of Record, Plaintiffs Testimony, supra note 20, vol. 4, at 1722
(Testimony of Powell Stackhouse) (explaining why Cambria Steel could not charge more
than U.S. Steel's Pittsburgh-plus price for rails).
129. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 154 (Buffington, J., concurring).
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the reason that my competitor next door would put the price down
$1 a ton, or $.50 a ton even, and we would be in a position where we
would be running without any profit at all.130
In accepting this account as exculpatory, Judge Buffington excluded con-
scious parallelism from the definition of a Sherman Act agreement. 13'
The Gary dinners were a different matter. Judge Buffington agreed
with the government's concession in the complaint that "merely assem-
bling and mutually exchanging information and declaration of pur-
pose,"1132 even a purpose "to charge such and such prices"'133 was not, by
itself, an unlawful agreement in restraint of trade. Judge Buffington rec-
ognized that "every large business has its societies and associations, and
these meet periodically to exchange information of all kinds" and that "if
each individual should choose to announce at such a meeting the specific
price he intends to charge for his wares, we are aware of no law that
forbids him so to do" so long as each individual was "acting for himself"
and not "pursuing a common object" with the others.134 When, on the
other hand, rivals "make distinct contracts with each other, either in the
form of pools or other agreements" to fix prices, their actions are clearly
unlawful, regardless of whether the agreement involves a penalty: "[i]n a
gentlemen's agreement the sanction is the sense of honor, the moral obli-
gation, the indefinite, but real, force that in some instances compel per-
sons to keep their promises simply because they have promised.' 35
The Gary dinners fell in a gray area between a simple declaration of
purpose and an express agreement without penalties. In a case where
competitors "refrain from making a definite formal agreement, and limit
themselves to an understating, a declaration of purpose-an announce-
ment of intention," a court can only determine if they have engaged in
illegal concerted action by determining "what the participants were really
doing."'1 36 The dinners, Judge Buffington suggested, began innocently
enough. Judge Gary and other guests at the inaugural dinner testified
that the steel trade was "demoralized" during the panic of 1907 because
all of the actors in the chain of distribution had large stocks on hand that
would have been devalued by a precipitous fall in steel prices. 137 Such an
event would drive them out of business and limit the market for new steel
production. In these conditions, Gary urged, producers should remain
130. Id. at 154 (quoting Schwab's testimony at a tariff hearing in 1908, which was read
into the record of the monopolization case) (emphasis added)).
131. Id.
132. Transcript of Record, Pleadings, Orders, Etc. vol. A, at 52, United States v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (No. 481) (Petition: United States v. U.S. Steel Corp.
(D.N.J. filed Oct. 26, 1911)).
133. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 155 (Buffington, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 154-55.
135. Id.; see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 320 U.S. 150, 179 (1940)
(characterizing an arrangement in which major refiners would buy up independents' excess
supplies as a "gentlemen's agreement").
136. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 155 (Buffington, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 156.
[Vol. 62
The Gary Dinners
calm and show both restraint in price policy and mutual respect. Judge
Buffington thought that, had the "loose" association of manufacturers en-
ded after this dinner, the government would not have complained. 138
The subsequent dinners and meetings, however, amounted to "a period
of cooperation, or action with a common object" between U.S. Steel and
most of its rivals "marked by an understanding concerning the mainte-
nance of price" that was "equivalent to an agreement. ' 139 In the
passages from the record quoted in the last Part, participants testified
that they "understood... they were under some kind of an obligation to
adhere to the prices that had been announced or declared as the general
sense of the meeting" at least "until they saw good reason to do other-
wise, and ... even then until they had signified to their associates their
intention to make a change. ' 140 The "final test" was that "the object and
effect were to maintain prices, at least to a considerable degree. '141 Such
an "understanding or moral obligation"1 42 was illegal even though the
participants assumed "no positive and expressed obligation"' 43 and "did
not intend to act illegally" or with "trickiness or attempted evasion." 144
Nor did it matter that some participants no doubt "silently dissented"145
or that "a large section of the trade paid little attention, if any, to this
effort at co-operation. '146
Like Judge Buffington, Judge Woolley thought the first Gary dinner
was innocuous, the "urgent request of a strong man that in the stress of
panic all should keep their heads and avoid the consequences of reckless
cutting of prices. ' 147 Later, however, the dinners provided a mechanism
not for "averting disaster, but [for] creating greater profits, by raising and
maintaining prices in periods of industrial calm. 1 48 At the dinners, par-
ticipants discussed the "general business of the industry," while at the
subcommittees, the members discussed "the business of a particular
branch of the trade."'149
At neither were agreements made concerning prices at which the par-
ticipants would sell their products. In fact, it was asserted and reas-
serted that such agreements were impossible, because illegal; but in
lieu of agreements, the parties, both at the dinners and at the com-
mittee meetings, severally made what they chose to call 'declarations
of purpose'-that is, declarations of the prices at which they respec-
tively proposed to sell their products, to which prices it is testified all
adhered until some one chose to deviate therefrom, in which event
138. Id. at 159.
139. Id. at 159-60 (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 160-61 (Buffington, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 160.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 161.
145. Id. at 160.
146. Id. at 161.





he was 'in decency' bound to notify his dinner associates or the mem-
bers of his committee. 150
The dinners, Judge Woolley concluded, were "in effect pools, with the
right reserved to each participant to withdraw upon notice to the others"
without penalty other than by the "force of a moral understanding."' 151
They "did not make it fatal for a competitor of the corporation to stay
out, but made it attractive for him to stay in.' 152 The pools of 1901-1904,
the statistical associations of 1904-1906, and the dinners of 1907-1911
were equally effective in maintaining prices. 153 During the "open mar-
ket" in 1909, Judge Woolley observed, prices fell and output increased,
thus proving that "the policy of co-operation as to prices, based upon
mutual understandings and enforced by moral obligations, [had until
then] operated effectually and unduly to restrain trade."'1 54 He asked sar-
castically, "Is it not strange that a breach of an understanding as to the
one matter of prices should have caused a discontinuance of the dinners,
with the consequent loss of their primary benefits?"'155 Confirming the
point, prices increased after the resumption of the dinners in October
1909.
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS IN MODERN PERSPECTIVE
The trial court's treatment of the Gary dinners can still help define the
reach of section l's agreement requirement. The modern controversy
over the meaning of concerted action has centered mainly on the problem
of conscious parallelism. Firms' actions are consciously parallel if they
coordinate a noncompetitive result-a price increase, for example-sim-
ply by anticipating and taking account of each others' likely responses to
their actions. Although commentators continue to debate the issue,
courts have concluded that simple conscious parallelism is lawful. 156 As
we saw in the last section, the courts in U.S. Steel anticipated this modern
consensus, holding consciously parallel pricing of steel rails lawful, even
though competitors had maintained identical prices for over a decade.
The twin opinions' analyses of the Gary dinners are also consistent with
the modern law of agreement under section 1, but they are especially
illuminating because of the procedural and historical setting in which they
arose. Modern cases have been preoccupied with whether a plaintiff has
either pleaded enough detail to avoid dismissal or discovered enough evi-
dence to avoid summary judgment. To raise an issue of agreement, a
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 175-76.
154. Id. at 175.
155. Id.
156. Conscious parallelism or tacit collusion is the process "not in itself unlawful, by
which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their
prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic




plaintiff must plead facts157 and produce evidence 158 that distinguishes
the defendants' conduct from simple consciously parallel action. But the
law has never clarified the definition of a Sherman Act agreement suffi-
ciently to distinguish concerted action from lawful conscious parallelism.
The Supreme Court has suggested that "[n]o formal agreement is neces-
sary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy"1 59 so long as the participants
had "a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a
meeting of minds. 1 60 These phrases suggest that concerted action may be
achieved by "means other than a direct exchange of assurances,"1 61 but
they are so vague that they could easily encompass consciously parallel
action, which the Court has held to be lawful.
The district court's opinions in U.S. Steel shed light on the nature of
unlawful concerted action, in part because they were the product of a
bench trial in which the court had the benefit of extraordinarily detailed
testimony. The court had direct evidence of both what the participants
said in meetings and how they understood others' statements.1 62 Conse-
quently, the court was able to identify clearly the conduct and communi-
cations that distinguished the actions of the steel manufacturers from
simple conscious parallelism. But the opinions are also revealing because
of the moment in antitrust history in which they were written. As he said
repeatedly in his speeches, Judge Gary believed, based on his reading of
antitrust law in 1907, that a program of cooperation would be lawful if the
participants avoided what he saw as the key element of agreement: an
exchange of promises. The participants seem to have followed this princi-
ple scrupulously. Judge Woolley found that the participants never en-
tered into "agreements ... concerning prices at which [they] would sell
their products. 1 63 Judge Buffington likewise recognized that the partici-
pants had "refrain[ed] from making a definite, formal agreement. 1 64
Consequently, both judges had to decide whether conduct that went be-
yond conscious parallelism yet fell short of an exchange of promises could
still be concerted.
The district court agreed with the government's concession in its com-
plaint that "merely assembling and mutually exchanging information and
declaration of purpose" concerning prices, as the participants in the din-
157. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). See generally, William
H. Page, Twombly and Communication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted Action
Under the New Pleading Standards, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. (forthcoming).
158. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
159. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
160. Id. at 810.
161. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st Century,
9 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 97, 100 (1997).
162. Cf. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir.
2002) (holding that direct evidence of conspiracy "is evidence tantamount to an acknowl-
edgment of guilt" and that circumstantial evidence "is everything else including ambiguous
statements" that require an inference to determine their meaning).
163. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 174 (D.N.J. 1915) (Wolley, J.,
concurring).
164. Id. at 155 (Buffington, J., concurring).
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ners certainly did, was insufficient by itself.165 But declarations of pur-
pose could become concerted if made with a "common object" and not
individually. 166 This phrasing of the issue required the court to determine
the mental states of the speakers. It was able to do so, in part by inter-
preting the substance of the communications and their relationship to
steel prices but also by examining the participants' testimony about their
understanding of the meaning of their words.
Although the participants assumed "no positive and expressed obliga-
tion" to adhere to announced prices, some conceded that their statements
created a "moral obligation" to do so, at least "until they saw good rea-
son to do otherwise, and ... even then until they had signified to their
associates their intention to make a change.1' 67 This sort of "an under-
standing about prices ... was equivalent to an agreement.' 68 The "final
test" for Judge Buffington was that "the object and effect were to main-
tain prices, at least to a considerable degree. ' 169 Judge Woolley similarly
reasoned that the participants achieved the same purpose and effect as an
agreement by "declarations of the prices at which they respectively pro-
posed to sell their products, to which prices ... all adhered until some one
chose to deviate therefrom, in which event he was 'in decency' bound to
notify his dinner associates or the members of his committee."' 70
The court's analysis of the Gary dinners is remarkably consistent with
Oliver Black's philosophical theory of concerted action, 171 which I have
argued provides a useful framework for understanding the requirements
of U.S. antitrust law.' 72 Black identifies a hierarchy of six levels of in-
creasing "correlation" among rivals' actions: (1) independent action, in
which each party acts independently of all others; (2) mutual belief, in
which firms act in the belief that others are acting in a certain way; (3)
mutual reliance, in which firms act both believing the others will act in a
certain way and relying on them to do so; (4) mutual reliance with a com-
165. Id. at 154.
166. Id. at 155.
167. Id. at 160.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 160-61. This analysis anticipates the famous hypothetical in Esco Corp. v.
United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965):
Let us suppose five competitors meet on several occasions, discuss their
problems, and one finally states-"I won't fix prices with any of you, but
here is what I am going to do-put the price of my gidget at X dollars; now
you all do what you want." He then leaves the meeting. Competitor number
two says- "I don't care whether number one does what he says he's going to
do or not; nor do I care what the rest of you do, but I am going to price my
gidget at X dollars." Number three makes a similar statement-"My price is
X dollars." Number four says not one word. All leave and fix "their" prices
at "X" dollars.
Like the court in U.S. Steel, the court in Esco reasoned that statements of intention must
be interpreted in light of "evidence as to what these competitors had done before such
meeting, and what actions they took thereafter, or what actions they did not take." Id.
170. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 174 (Woolley, J., concurring).
171. See generally OLIVER BLACK, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST (2005).




mon goal, in which firms act both believing the others will act in a certain
way and relying on them to do so, and in doing so the firms have the same
goal; (5) mutual reliance with a common goal and with knowledge, in
which firms act knowing that fourth condition is satisfied. 173 At this level
of correlation, the rivals' actions amount to conscious parallelism. For
example, as Charles Schwab testified in U.S. Steel, the uniform pricing of
steel rails required a "tacit understanding" not to deviate from that
price, 174 because of shared knowledge that doing so would precipitate a
price war. What distinguishes this sort of conduct from unlawful con-
certed action, the sixth level of correlation, is communication: in con-
certed action, firms act with mutual reliance, a common goal, and
knowledge gained, in part, by communication. 175 The firms are able, in
other words, to engage in consciously parallel conduct in part because
they communicated their reliance and their goals to each other. Commu-
nications are far more likely to meet these conditions if they involve fu-
ture prices and are repeated.' 76
The court in U.S. Steel understood concerted action in a similar way.
The tacit, mutual perception of self-interest that maintained the price of
steel rails was not collusive in the court's view, even though the producers
had reached the common purpose of avoiding the price wars of the past.
The Gary dinners crossed the line because they involved communications
that helped produce the reliance, belief, and knowledge necessary to
maintain prices. 177 The communications in the committee meetings ex-
pressed the speakers' intention to charge a specific price and were ad-
dressed to rivals in the markets in which the speakers competed.
Although the court did not condemn all statements of intention about
future prices, it recognized their centrality in a system of concerted ac-
tion. The court observed that many participants had conceded that that
they left the committee meetings "with the general understanding, each
relying upon the other, that the prices announced would be maintained.'1 78
This reliance, and the understanding that others would rely, even if not
expressed in so many words at the meeting itself, was the product of
Gary's insistent promotion at the dinners of the norm that business honor
and decency required steel manufacturers to disclose to their rivals any
departures from their announced prices.1 79
173. BLACK, supra note 171, at 185-87. He uses the term correlation consciously in
order to avoid terms that imply a legal characterization.
174. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 154 (Buffington, J., concurring).
175. BLACK, supra note 171, at 187.
176. Page, supra note 172, at 431 (discussing Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner, &
Andrew M. Rosenfield, Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust,
5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 435-36 (1997)). For a discussion of communication of past
prices, see id. at 446 (discussing Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d
1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000)).
177. BLACK, supra note 171, at 186-87.
178. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 159 (Buffington, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
179. David Sally, Two Economic Applications of Sympathy, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 455,
465 (2002) (citing the Gary dinners as an effort to promote sympathy among rivals as a
means of facilitating concerted action on prices). For further discussion of the role of trust
20091
SMU LAW REVIEW
Also like Black,180 the district court distinguished a completed verbal
agreement from concerted action. Judge Buffington observed that "dis-
tinct contracts . . . in the form of pools or other agreements" were unlaw-
ful, and that this prohibition extended to a "gentlemen's agreement" in
which the only "sanction is the sense of honor" that "compel[s] persons
to keep their promises simply because they have promised."' 8' This sort
of verbal agreement is complete if one party makes a conditional promise
and another party makes a promise in response, even if the parties under-
take no act in furtherance of the agreement. 182 But both opinions also
condemned arrangements like the Gary dinners, in which the participants
took pains not to make promises1 83 and instead only announced their in-
tentions. That sort of arrangement constituted concerted action where
the parties acted consistently with their statements, felt a "moral obliga-
tion" to do so, and relied on other participants to do the same. 184 The
arrangement had "the object and effect [of] maintain[ing] prices, at least
to a considerable degree."'1 85 Although modern courts will never have
the volume or clarity of testimony about communications that the courts
in U.S. Steel had, they can benefit from their predecessors' analyses.
in cartel maintenance, see generally Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82
TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004).
180. BLACK, supra note 171, at 164-66. Black interprets Article 81 of the European
Treaty, which prohibits both agreements and "concerted practices." Id. at 166. Section 1
of the Sherman Act does not explicitly make this distinction.
181. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 155.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940)
("[A] conspiracy to fix prices violates § 1 of the Act though no overt act is shown, though it
is not established that the conspirators had the means available for accomplishment of
their objective, and though the conspiracy embraced but a part of the interstate or foreign
commerce in the commodity.").
183. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 160 (recognizing that "there was no positive and expressed
obligation; no formal words of contract were used").
184. BLACK, supra note 171, at 159-60 (criticizing a European case that suggested that
communication of intentions can be concerted practice even if "the parties do not act in
mutual reliance"); Oliver Black, Communication, Concerted Practices, and the Oligopoly
Problem, 1 EUR. COMPETITION J. 341, 342-46 (2005) (arguing that, in concerted action, the
participants' act must cause the rival to believe the firm is acting in reliance on the rival's
corresponding act); see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142
(1948) (holding an arrangement may be unlawful if "a concert of action is contemplated
and . . . defendants conformed to that arrangement"); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) ("It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was
contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and partici-
pated in it."); Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding
that an inference of "mutual consent" did not require "an exchange of assurances to take
or refrain from a given course of conduct"; it would be sufficient that one firm proposed to
act in a certain way "in the presence of other competitors" and then did so "generally and
customarily-and continuously for all practical purposes, even though there be slight
variations").
185. U.S. Steel, 223 F. at 161. The court also observed that "in actual effect prices were
more or less maintained," even though "a large section of the trade paid little attention, if




The record in U.S. Steel is a window onto the mechanisms of the Gary
dinners. The testimony and exhibits reveal what steel executives said and
thought at the meetings and how the steel market responded. The district
court's decision reviewing this evidence and condemning the dinners was
an important step in the evolution of antitrust. It broadened the prevail-
ing understanding of the nature of a Sherman Act agreement in the con-
text of concerted action and influenced the design of later information
exchange arrangements, particularly the open price systems186 and simi-
lar information exchange arrangements that were the subject of impor-
tant Supreme Court decisions during the 1920s. 187 Its focus on
communication of intent and reliance and competitive effects can still
teach us important lessons about the nature of concerted action.
186. Milton N. Nelson, The Effect of Open Price Association Activities on Competition
and Prices, 13 AM. ECON. REV. 258, 259 (1923) (observing that Arthur Eddy had "taken
note of Mr. Gary's experience in attempting to stabilize the iron and steel industry by
building up among competitors a spirit of cooperation through the instrumentality of the
so-called Gary Dinners" and realized that "understandings in violation of law inevitably
followed upon the heels of discussions devoted to a consideration of future prices, produc-
tion policy and the like, but that exchange of information dealing only with past transac-
tions could never be construed as being in the nature of understandings in contravention of
law."). Eddy first advanced his ideas in ARTHUR J. EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE CONDITIONS UNDERLYING THE RADICAL CHANGE THAT is TAKING
PLACE IN THE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORLD-THE CHANGE FROM A COMPETI-
TIVE TO A COOPERATIVE BASIS (1913).
187. See, e.g., Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925);
Maple Flooring Mfg. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. Am.
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377 (1921).
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